Discursive Australia: 
Public Discussion of Refugees in the Early Twenty-First Century

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Abstract

This paper interrogates recurring discourses in Australia’s public domain with regards to the issue of refugees and Australianness, and how they have been used to ratify notions of inclusion and exclusion with regards to what being Australian - or indeed being un-Australian - does and should mean. The unpacking of these primary discursive positions will be based on an analysis of the letters to the editor published in both The Australian (Australia’s national newspaper) and The West Australian, covering one key period from 22 January to 28 February 2002 (a period encompassing the Woomera hunger strike).

Introduction

The discussion within Australia of events and phenomena within the last three years, such as 9/11, the Bali bombing, the Tampa affair and the children overboard event, as well as the numbers of refugees approaching Australian shores (also termed ‘asylum seekers’, ‘illegal immigrants’ and ‘boatpeople’ by politicians and the media), has coalesced around an apparent dichotomy in discourses in public use concerning these events. Tending to binarism, within Australia at least, by either coalescing around ideas of ‘protectivism’ or ‘humanitarianism’ (Mummery and Rodan, 2003), these public discourses can furthermore be seen to have instantiated a debate concerning the contentious issue of what it means to be Australian, and who is or should be included or excluded from this national identity. This project, then, drawing on our earlier research, aims to unpack and analyse these recurring discourses in terms of this issue of perceived Australianness by focusing on the public discussion of refugees, a discussion that has had an on-going presence in Australia’s public domain in the aftermath of September 11 and the Tampa. Specifically, we suggest that these discourses have foregrounded - and perhaps even ratified - very particular attitudes as to what being Australian - or indeed being un-Australian - does and should mean. The unpacking of primary discursive positions regarding Australianness and refugees will be based on an analysis of letters to the editor published in both The Australian (Australia’s national newspaper) and The West Australian, covering one key period from 22 January to 28 February 2002 (a period encompassing the Woomera hunger strike).

Finally, we consider some of the implications of this debate, suggesting by way of conclusion that we need to move our debate from an all-too-easy expression and emphasis of
this contention as divisiveness, and what we could call ‘wedge politics’. Rather, we suggest that we should reframe this sort of contention in terms of the more nuanced relations made possible through the notion of what we call, following Chantal Mouffe, ‘articulation’, relations that we will discuss in more detail later, along with some of their implications for how we understand our social life.

**Context**

Before we begin our analysis, however, there are a number of points that require some initial clarification. These concern the general role and responsibility of the media, the more specific role of letters to the editor, the way these roles shore up particular notions of Australian national identity and, finally, our basic approach and methodology. With regards to the first of these points, many media theorists, media analysts and politicians in Australia would see the role and responsibility of the media as being much more than simply meeting market demand and, thereby, media users as more than consumers (Raboy et al., 2001; Jacka, 2000; Schultz, 1994). The media is thus seen as playing a social role - that is, as having a responsibility to audience members as national citizens, voters, members of a public sphere and so on. As such, there seems to be, as Norman Fairclough (1995) puts it, a “complex dialectic” existing “between the media and the conversational discourse of everyday life” (p. 64). Indeed, as he continues, we can usefully examine media discourse as a “domain of cultural power and hegemony” (p. 67). In a similar vein Wanning Sun (2005, forthcoming) writes that the print media can instil in diverse individuals “the confidence that whatever they are doing (or reading, watching, or listening) is shared anonymously by the rest of the population.” That is, it can instil a sense of community.

In this way, it seems clear that letters to the editor do represent instances of public debate, albeit in a limited form, and additionally represent sites for the development of public opinion. As Karin Wahl-Jorgensen (2002a) notes in her analyses of the role of letters to the editor, many letters editors see this section as a “wide open public forum” (p. 130). Although it is clear that this belief is unrealistic, given firstly the role of letters editors in selecting and editing letters for publication and, secondly, the fact that letter writers tend not to be representative of the general population, Wahl-Jorgensen (2001) nonetheless concludes that letters to the editor are “conducive to the creation of social solidarity” (p. 304). They are, in other words, conducive to the creation of both public opinion and a sense of identity, in this case of Australianness. For instance, as Ryfe (2001) has noted, letter writers tend to assume “the voice of the collective ‘we’”, seeing themselves as speaking “for me and for everyone else” (p. 777). Hence, in writing on behalf of all ‘Australians’, ‘patriots’, ‘fellow human beings’ and so on, letter writers not only assume that their views are embodiments of public opinion - an assumption that is, of course, partially borne out by the tendency of the print media to publish letters that are already representative of perceived common themes - but in effect legitimate certain discourses as proper to the public discussion of current events. In other words, despite the very real constraints preventing us from seeing letters to the editor either as a simple reflection of public opinion or as indicative of the sort of unmediated public debate desired by Habermas, it is by the very foregrounding of certain discourses within these published letters (each asserting or supporting a collectivity) that these discourses can be normalised, to at least some extent, within the public domain.

Finally, our approach and methodology. To begin with, as should be clear by now, we are not simply engaged in a micro-level practice of applied linguistics or content-analysis. Rather, we are concerned with developing here what we call, following McHoul and Fairclough, a critical discourse analysis. Such an approach allows us to explore some of the
specific ways in which the ‘social objects’ of refugees and Australianness have been spoken, written and thought about at a specific point in history. After all, as Fairclough et al (2004) put it, we “organize and act through particular discourses” insofar as discourses can “simultaneously sustain, legitimize, and change” our ways of acting and organising (p. 2). In other words, it allows us to argue for the inter-relation of discourses being utilised in the public domain and social attitudes, an inter-relation that thereby registers the “discourse-led character of social change” (p. 2).

Last of all, we do need to stress again that, although we are arguing that the debate, as exemplified here in letters to the editor, instantiates and ratifies the discrete public discourses that we have previously called ‘protectivism’ and ‘humanitarianism’, these discourses are in no way individually homogeneous. They each incorporate a range of different threads and values that may be only loosely inter-related. Additionally, as we will show, they both interact around the notions of what it means to be Australian and un-Australian.

Protectivism: keeping them out, they’re un-Australian

They forced their way in here then made demands and held a gun to our heads and we are supposed to welcome them with open arms. No way... Get rid of them and put a stop to this madness. (Butler, WA, 29/01/02)

This type of protectivist discourse has become increasingly common since September 11 and President George Bush’s ensuing Address to the Nation, where he made a clear distinction between ‘us’ (civilised) and ‘them’ (barbaric), further contending that “if you’re not with us, then you’re against us.” In this view, ‘they’ mark a threat that is simply too great to be borne, whether ‘they’ come in the form of terrorists, Muslims or refugees - particularly given that, within Australia, these categories have also tended to be conflated by this discourse. Letter-writers using this discourse consequently call for the threat to be removed: “Send them back” (Hollitt, WA, 31/01/02; cf. Young, WA, 1/02/02); “Remove the lot of them” (Hanley, WA, 29/01/02). Indeed, for this discursive position, “keeping these people out of our civilized and beautiful country” (Campbell, WA, 28/01/02) is a priority.

Overall, then, within post-Tampa Australia the ‘they’ has come to mean “illegal immigrants” who are also “criminals” (e.g. Campbell, WA, 28/01/02). They are “not like us.” They have a “belligerent attitude” (Edwards, WA, 28/02/02), engage in appalling and “inappropriate behaviour” which inspires in us a “deep repugnance” (Koehne, A, 24/01/02). Indeed, they demonstrate a “total lack of humanity” (Ford, WA, 2/02/02) and represent a “danger to Australia” (Christy, A, 24/01/02):

[S]urely all Australians would not want these people wandering around in our community. Do we really want these desperate kinds of acts to be part of our culture when someone cannot get what they want? (Davidson, WA, 22/01/02)

The main point that seems to underpin this discourse, then, is that the ‘they’ have no possible place in our community. Further, we are unable to envision that they might ever ‘fit in’ to our community, believing rather that ‘they won’t and/or can’t integrate’.

Now, there are, of course, a number of ways we could further unpack this discourse of protectivism. However, what we want to focus on here is how this discourse is deployed to underpin a very specific notion of what it means to be Australian. Basically, for this discourse, being Australian entails abiding by a particular set of values, values which, it is also worth noting, have tended to be framed here in negative terms - that is, being Australian
means not being or doing certain things. In other words, we affirm what it is to be Australian by recognising what it is to be un-Australian. For instance, being Australian means fitting into the wider Australian community - it means not establishing oneself in a separate cultural enclave (Marsh, WA, 22/07/04). Being Australian also means abiding by Australian laws and common practices. More specifically, it means not “stoning and subjugat[ing] women, [practicing] genital mutilation and hangings” (Catchatoor, WA, 2/02/02). It is further linked to not wantonly destroying property or one’s documentation, not rioting, not engaging in acts of self-mutilation and not trying to force the government’s hand or hold it to ransom (e.g. Cohen, A, 29/01/02). Finally, being Australian entails definitely not engaging in any acts of child abuse (Mann, WA, 24/01/02).

To sum up, then, it seems that being un-Australian, as far as it is instantiated through this protectivist discourse, is to commit actions and practices that are seen to be themselves intrinsically un-Australian: “Anyone who does that to their child is not only unfit as a parent but also unfit to be an Aussie” (Radford, WA, 22/01/01), and

will they renounce their misogyny, arranged marriages, genital mutilation, religious intolerance and extreme interpretations of female modesty? I think not. Such practices are endemic in their culture and have endured for centuries. (Norgaard, WA, 5/02/02)

Humanitarianism: being Australian means giving everyone a ‘fair go’

To those protesting the actions of the asylum-seekers at Woomera: What situation would you have to find yourself in, to sew up your mouth, swallow poison or use your children as political tools? I’d imagine it’d have to be pretty dire. Perhaps you shouldn’t be so quick to judge these people until you’ve walked a mile in their shoes. (Grant, A, 24/01/02)

In contrast to the previous discursive position, that coalescing around an ideal of ‘humanitarianism’ is not premised on the exclusive and divisive (see Evans, A, 19/10/01; cf. Ruddock, A, 27/09/01; Morgan, A, 15/02/02) logic of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, but on an inclusive logic emphasising the common identity of being human, of shared humanity. This is also at the base of a recognition of obligation and responsibility. In this case, ‘we’ (the Australian nation) are delineated as having an obligation, both individually and as a nation, toward asylum seekers (DeAngelis, A, 12/02/02; Everingham, A, 7/02/02).

For this reason, letter writers with this view claim that ‘we’ have a duty and responsibility to ‘shelter’ refugees simply because they are ‘fellow human beings’ (Mills, A, 30/01/02; Taskis, A, 5/02/02; Inglis, WA, 1/02/02; Rogers, WA, 30/01/02). Such an attitude also results in a very different view of refugees. Actions that were read in the previous discourse as criminal or unsavory - or indeed as un-Australian - are here read as demonstrating ‘desperation’, ‘distress’ and ‘frustration’ (e.g. Byrne and White, WA, 1/02/02; Ainsley, WA, 2/02/2; Tonkinson, A, 26-27/01/02). These actions are performed by people who are at their ‘wits’ end’ and at ‘breaking point’ (Hill, WA, 24/01/02; Hoffman, A, 30/01/02). Such actions “indicate the extremity of their personal darkness” and “anguish” (Farran and Curnow, A, 29/01/02). Furthermore, they are understandable insofar as “denied any voice, they only have their bodies to communicate their utter desperation” (Hoffman, A, 30/01/02).
If your national response is to incarcerate, demoralize and remove hope and any capacity for independence of action, then primitive behaviours of despair, rage and envy emerge. (Tonge, A, 29/01/02)

The events at Woomera are creating a tribal psyche that has no sense of hope and is beginning to decay from despair. (Farran and Curnow, A, 29/01/02)

Now, what we see here, then, is an interesting reversal in perspective from that of the previous discourse. Whereas proponents of protectivism are primarily concerned with ‘them’ and their actions - and how they do not conform to our required standard - those promoting humanitarianism have focused their concern on ‘us’ and our actions. This reversal is particularly interesting when we consider the issue of Australianness. Basically, proponents of humanitarian discourse bring the markers of Australianness to bear on those who already claim that identity. In other words, far from ‘them’ being “unfit to be an Aussie” (Radford, WA, 22/01/01), ‘we’ are being un-Australian in treating “vulnerable, scared and traumatized people with contempt” (Groessler, A, 29/01/02), where being un-Australian means being inhumane (Supple, A, 11/02/02; Humberston, WA, 29/01/02; Warren, WA, 23/02/02), un-Christian (Hyde, A, 04/02/02; O’Leary, A, 8/02/02; Ainsley, WA, 2/02/02; Geoghegan, A, 14/02/02) and racist (Timcke, A, 11/02/02). As one letter writer puts it, “[i]t is we who are really mutilated, not the detainees” (Farran and Curnow, A, 29/01/02). And another:

It’s getting to the stage where I am ashamed to be called an Australian when so many of my own countrymen [sic] hold the view that this is the right way to treat refugees. (Ainsley, 2/02/02 WA)

To put this in positive terms, then, being Australian means giving people a ‘fair go’, the “benefit of the doubt” (Groessler, A, 29/01/02), and giving them the chance to ‘live’ in and “contribute to [a free] society” (White, WA, 1/02/02). These, then, are the very markers of Australianness that proponents of this sort of discourse suggest that we are not displaying.

Finally, given that this discursive position critiques the performance of our un-Australianness at the institutional (political) as well as the individual level, we now need to look at the way certain tenets of both of these discourses have seemed to further instantiate and ratify an overarching discourse of divisiveness and wedge politics. That is, we need to consider the interaction of these two discursive positions.

The discourse of divisiveness

To begin with, even a brief consideration of the letters published in this period shows a strong trend towards the establishing and maintaining of clear divisions, not only between the refugees and the broader Australian community, but between proponents of each of these major discourses. Indeed, any debate between proponents of these disparate discourses seems to lead inexorably into name-calling. Although the letters editor for The Australian intervened in late 2001 in letters discussing the Tampa refugees, stating that “‘reverse abuse’ will not be a continuing theme on the Letters page” (A, 30/11/01), name-calling has nonetheless been quite consistent throughout this later period of letters.

For instance, it is very clear that for letter writers drawing on the tenets of humanitarian discourses, anyone (other letter writers, the government and/or critics of the refugees) who is not prepared to show compassion (Reynolds, WA, 22/01/02), or even simple humanity to refugees, is “mean, nasty and selfish” (Cariss, WA, 2/02/02; Emery, WA,
Humanitarian letter writers are “ashamed of recent events” (Hughes-d’Aeth, WA, 18/02/02), “ashamed of our country’s position” (Pryor, A, 1/02/02), and appalled at how the Australian people can be so easily “moved to irrational hatred against a group of fellow human beings” (Hughes-d’Aeth, WA, 18/02/02). Overall, they see the federal government’s policies about mandatory detention as ‘misguided’ (Cannon, A, 24/01/02), ‘harsh’ (Tonkinson, A, 26-27/01/02), ‘racist’ (Ryan, A, 26-27/01/02; Slater, A, 29/01/02; Tranter, A, 12/02/02; Reynolds, WA, 22/01/02; Ondaatje, WA, 20/02/02) and ‘unconscionable’ (Anderson, A, 2-3/02/02). Most basically, they are appalled at how these policies have been used firstly to “foster public anger towards a group of people for electoral benefit” and, secondly, to “rationalise evil” (Kan, A, 2-3/02/02; Gill, WA, 13/02/02).

For such proponents of the humanitarian discourse, then, these attitudes to refugees not only result in a “climate of unease and fear” (Belfield, WA, 18/02/02), but a prevailing and far-reaching discourse of divisiveness that can be seen to be entrenched in a number of ways. First of all, as we have already discussed, we have that very basic distinction being sustained between ‘us’ (civilised Australians) and ‘them’ (barbaric refugees), a division that has resulted in Australia’s policies and practices concerning refugees being described as demonising and ‘dehumanising’ (e.g. Fazel, A, 14/02/02). In addition, we have a grossly observable division being entrenched between proponents of each of the two main discursive positions. Here, proponents of humanitarian discourses clash with those of protectivist discourses over such issues as how we should treat refugees, how we should see those key institutions directly concerned with the treatment of refugees and, of course, just what it means to be Australian. This division, as we have already shown here (see also Mummery and Rodan, 2003), has been maintained in particular through a process of on-going name-calling. For instance, those holding to the other discursive position are called bleeding hearts, the chattering classes, racists, xenophobic, stony hearts and so forth: “I would rather be known as having a ‘bleeding heart’ than a ‘stony heart’” (Morgan, WA, 5/02/02).

As noted, this divisiveness is also carried on to respective attitudes towards those institutions involved in Australia’s treatment of refugees. For supporters of a humanitarian discursive position, these institutions have been tarnished. For instance, the federal government is called upon to move out of the “political sewer”, “regain some national respectability” (Reynolds, WA, 18/02/02), and “to conduct our debate in a morally constructive way that will lead to honorable solutions” (Date, WA, 4/02/02). As another letter writer puts it,

[a]part from the effect on the refugees themselves, the saddest aspect of this whole sordid affair of vilification of asylum-seekers is what it has done to the integrity of our defense and security services and our federal public service. These institutional icons have been irreparably damaged. (Argy, A, 15/02/02; cf. Anderson, A, 2-3/02/02)

In contrast, supporters of a protectivist discourse see these same institutions and their policies as reflecting “the ‘court of public opinion’” (Gamble, WA, 31/01/02), and as carrying out the will of the Australian public. They are in fact representatives of the “voice of reason” (Robinson, A, 31/01/01). As one letter writer puts it:

John Howard’s Government was overwhelmingly elected on a policy of firm action where illegal immigrants were concerned. Any backdown by Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock would amount to a gross betrayal of the Australian electorate. (Lea, WA, 29/01/02; cf. Campbell, WA, 28/01/02)
Furthermore, those calling for a ‘backdown’ by the government are described in ways that represent them to be naïve, a ‘soft-touch’ (Cohen, A, 29/01/02), if not irrelevant: they are “sideline commentators” who have had the “great luxury of never actually having to make the hard [read ‘real’] decisions” (Cameron, A, 26-27/01/02).

Overall, then, it seems apparent that on these and other issues, and through a process reminiscent of wedge politics, these contrasting discursive positions are being viewed by their respective proponents as irreconcilable, suggesting in addition that these discursive positions mark heterogeneous sections of the community. It would thus seem that this discourse and practice of divisiveness is becoming entrenched within this domain, and also perhaps within Australian society.

**Problems and possibilities**

Political parties are constantly criticized for not allowing their members to dissent publicly from party policy. However, whenever a genuine debate occurs within any party - as in the current Labor Party about its policy on asylum-seekers - all the media immediately talk, or write about, ‘split’, ‘schism’ or ‘infighting’. Why do they not report that there is a healthy debate about policy? Until they do so, they will hinder the development of the vigorous, open debate that our political system needs. (Hutchison, A, 12/02/02)

There are, of course, several points to be considered in this section. Certainly any argument suggesting a causal link between what is expressed in letters to the editor and the actual state of society is highly problematic. As we have already noted, it is simply not possible to make this sort of link for a number of reasons. Nonetheless, we do contend, along with Fairclough et al, that one way to better understand social life (and change) is to examine the discourses that, for one reason or another, have become entrenched in the public domain.

Turning, then, to our foregoing analysis, we are concerned at the ease at which debate in the public domain has tended to close down into name-calling, the reification and reiteration of fixed identity claims (‘us’, ‘them’, Australian, un-Australian), and the accompanying reliance on wedge politics and its associated practice of divisiveness. We believe that it is becoming increasingly important to challenge this all-too-easy recourse to a discourse of divisiveness, and those practices that close debate down rather than open it up. Now, there is, of course, no easy solution to this tendency, no matter how we unpack the debates being played out in the public domain. However, one possibility here, we suggest, is to shift the discursive frame of our debate on refugees and Australianness from divisiveness to what Chantal Mouffe has called ‘articulation’. That is, to move from the compulsive reiteration of difference (between, for instance, respective proponents of protectivism and humanitarianism, as well as between refugees and the Australian community) to an affirmation of practices and possibilities of relation and connection. Such practices would not assume and desire sameness or full assimilation as such, but would rather promote the development and recognition of equivalences and common concerns as the basis for continuously transformative negotiation, dialogue and, in the long run, community. Such practices could, in other words, sustain the pluralism of a highly provisional and contingent ‘we’. This would be a ‘we’ that, having recognised its own contingent character, would be cautious in arguing from claims of identity, inclusivity or exclusivity.

This possibility and proposal is not, of course, new and is in fact to be found throughout the letters we examined. In amongst the prevailing tendency toward closing debate down and name-calling - tendencies we see as indicative of a reliance on processes of division
and exclusion - we have a call for a “vigorous, open debate” (Hutchison, A, 12/02/02). We have a call to

allow [the refugees] into the community so that we can communicate with them, hear their stories and start thinking of them as people. [And so that] [m]aybe then some of the people who don’t want them may learn to understand them. (Silvester, WA, 28/01/02)

It is a call, in other words, to move beyond the reification of differences. It does not demand the immediate rejection of difference, but suggests dialogue and negotiation as the basis for recognising possible equivalences, these being the basis for any community. Indeed, the ‘people of Dubbo’ are held up by several letter writers as exemplifying such a possibility because of their welcoming of refugees into their community. That is, they can be seen as instituting their community not through any presupposed sense of its make-up, but through what we could describe as practices of articulating disparate elements and, in so doing, transforming them.

Overall, then, this is a proposal for a change in how we perceive our social relations with others. It is a proposal to move from the publicly entrenched ‘us versus them’ binary - whether it is the binary of the Australian community versus refugees, or that between the proponents of protectivism versus those of humanitarianism - to the possibility of a loosely articulated ‘we’ engaged in dialogue and negotiation, engaged indeed in what Mouffe would argue is the very basis for any democratic community. After all, a democratic community, as Mouffe sees it, is neither the result of rational communicative debate among disinterested citizens who have reached consensus (as John Rawls suggests), nor is it the result of shared norms (as Habermas suggests). Nor is it the top-down instantiation argued for by many letter writers, where we are part of a community (or civilised, or moral, or democratic and so on) because of who we are, while you are not because of who you are. Rather, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001) put it, “the experience of democracy should consist of the recognition of the multiplicity of social logics along with the necessity of their articulation”, the latter of which needs to be “constantly re-created and renegotiated” (p. 188).

Consequently, a community (even that of a nation) is very far from having any clear-cut identity or even clear-cut borders. The ‘we’ of any community is instead necessarily provisional and partial - the outcome of a relating or articulating with no inherent or ideal selfness or identity. Community is hence nothing more and nothing less than the result of the negotiations that emerge from the bottom up, and are lived, experienced and articulated in the everyday by already interested and involved people. Far from being an abstract ideal, community results from the doing of those transformative negotiations which exemplify the democratic process. It is, as Mouffe stresses elsewhere, a form of life that is only instantiated by the doing of it.14 Further, to misquote Mouffe, realising the ‘we’ of any community entails also realising the impossibility of ever fully releasing any community.15

This is also a proposal for a change in how we might more fruitfully consider apparently irreconcilable discourses in the public sphere, where debate is unlikely to be settled via recourse to either abstract ideals or even rational argumentation.16 After all, as should be clear from the preceding analysis, these letter writers are affirming disparate discourses17 in highly passionate ways, ways that tend to result in the wholesale dismissal of contrasting discourses. When, however, we look to the doing of articulation - in this case, the possible articulation of the different discourses regarding refugees and Australianness - we recognise that difference need not end in divisiveness. Far from seeing divisive conflict as the end of discussion or negotiation, or indeed as rigidifying community (or indeed national) boundaries, Mouffe’s work reminds us that these conflicts can be reframed. To best overcome
divisiveness, we, and our community, can perhaps begin with moving to a practice of articulation.

References


1 News Limited owns The Australian. There are twelve daily newspapers and two national newspapers in Australia - News Limited owns over half and Fairfax owns a quarter (Australian Financial Review as well as the state newspapers Sydney Morning Herald and The Age in Melbourne). Kerry Stokes owns The West Australian. There is little diversity in ownership of the Australian newspaper press.

2 The periods chosen are important for several reasons: major events for Australia as the aftermath of September 11, the arrival of the Tampa in Australian waters, the detaining and processing of refugees, Australia’s 2001 federal election, the Woomera hunger strikes and the issue of the eventual release of refugees into the Australian community. Second, these periods encompass intense public debate of these issues; debate that we argue has foregrounded - and perhaps even ratified - very particular attitudes and discursive positions that we contend are centred on the contentious issue of Australianness.

3 We are using the term in a similar sense to that of Shaun Wilson and Nick Turnbull (2001) as a “calculated political tactic aimed at using divisive social issues to gain political support, weaken opponents and strengthen control over the political agenda” (p. 3). The method is enabled by knowing about “issues and groups” which draw “resentment or antipathy in the wider electorate”; these issues and/or groups are exposed in “party polling, focus groups” and by monitoring mass media, such as talk back radio, letters to the editors and so on. However, although Wilson and Turnbull go on to argue that identifying and utilising “populist attitudes and sentiment” in political campaigns does not in itself define ‘wedge politics’ - arguing that another level of ‘political calculation’ is necessary, specifically “to take advantage of issues or policies that undermine the support base of a political opponent” (p. 3) - here we want to use the notion of ‘politics’ in a much broader sense than just ‘party politics’. More specifically, we use ‘wedge politics’ here to clarify the process by which public discussion of social issues has worked to divide communities into seemingly heterogeneous sections. Steve Mickler (2004) illustrates the way in which this works in his analyses of talkback radio. He argues that talkback radio was “ideally suited to the ‘wedge politics’ - “racial or ethnic wedge” - the
Howard government deployed for the duration and prior to the 1998 and 2001 federal elections (p.100).

4 We should stress that in no way are we here advocating one of the discursive positions over the other. Rather, we suggest that it is the relationship between these positions that needs to be re-thought.

5 In investigating the extent to which letter writers are representative of the general population, most research has found that letter writers tend to be “white, middle-aged and well-educated males who are firmly situated in a community and have the excess time and energy required for a commitment to political activism” (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2002b, p. 77; cf. Sparks and Perez, 1991). In addition to this constraint, Wahl-Jorgensen also contends that letters editors select letters on the basis of four rules: “relevance, entertainment, brevity, and authority” (2002b, p. 70). Selection of letters, then, is based on both content and form, with them needing to be well written, grammatically correct and persuasive. Through this selection process, then, letter writers who want to be published learn to present well written, strong and unambiguous positions, with the resultant letters delivering passionately held beliefs containing no doubts as to the letter writer’s standpoint. In Judith Elen’s (Letters editor for The Australian in 2001) words, letters need to be “about one issue... as short as possible, straight to the point... passionate... but informed and the information correct” (The Media Report, 12/07/01). For a detailed discussion of editorial policy concerning letters to the editor, see Karin Wahl-Jorgensen’s Understanding the conditions for public discourse: four rules for selecting letters to the editor, Journalism Studies; and Letters to the editor as a forum for public deliberation: modes of publicity and democratic debate, Critical Studies in Media Communication.

6 We mean here Habermas’ desire for a domain for public debate (and information gathering) that is free from explicit interference, whether by government, business or other interests. Given that these letters (and letter writers), in many cases, passionately defend a highly specific ‘way of life’, it is certainly problematic to see them as part of a rational ‘open debate’ by disinterested and independent citizens (Webster, 1995, p. 103). Conversely, given that letter writers do tend to declare their own positions up-front - one of the main criteria for information that is useful for this domain/debate - it is still possible to argue that letters can deliver pertinent information to the Habermasian public sphere.

7 As McHoul (1994) points out, under this approach - drawn from that of ‘continental discourse theorists’ such as Michel Foucault and Jean François Lyotard - a discourse refers to “relatively well bounded areas of social knowledge,” and is most simply “whatever constrains - but also enables - writing, speaking, and thinking within... specific historical limits” (p. 944).

8 From our analysis of the two newspapers over the same period (from 22 January to 28 February 2002), we observed a slight difference with regard to letter content in each. By and large, in the West Australian letters section there was greater support for the government policy regarding detention of refugees - that is, a stronger thread of the protectivism discourse. The Australian letters section, however, tended to have a more evenly balanced amount of letters in terms of each discourse.

9 All letter extracts are from letters published in the letters to the editor sections in either The West Australian (WA) or The Australian (A) on the date given.

10 For our discussion of this distinction, see our paper Discourses of democracy in the aftermath of 9/11 and other events: protectivism versus humanitarianism (Mummery and Rodan, 2003).

11 It must be noted, however, that the premise which informs this position of globalised humanitarianism - the notion that we all share an ‘essential’ humanity - also marks it as
problematic. That is, this premise asserts a form of cultural relativism. To put it another way, with its essential foundation being our shared humanness, cultural identity is construed as something which is layered over the top, as opposed to something one is born into and which is inextricably linked with being human.

12 It is worth noting that this division was also seen to be maintained through a deliberate policy of refusing the media, and other independent observers, access to refugees in detention centres. As one letter writer puts it, we have been “kept in the dark” (Deeth, A, 30/01/02): “Let the media in. Let the truth be known and let the refugees be heard” (Hoffman, A, 30/01/02; cf. Deeth, A, 30/01/02; Davidson, A, 1/02/02).

13 ‘Articulation’ is a concept drawn on heavily by Chantal Mouffe in her work on democracy (e.g. 2000, 1993). She argues, for instance, that the democratic project certainly doesn’t have a clear-cut identity or community, instead suggesting that pluralism and its character of conflict are not only constitutive of the political, but vital resources for actual democracy. She suggests that democratic practice can only call for the establishing of equivalences, and not consensus or identity. It is this establishing and negotiating of contingent equivalences and common concerns that she describes as ‘articulation’.

14 Mouffe (2000) discusses the democratic process in terms of the Wittgensteinian ‘forms of life’ in *The democratic paradox*.

15 Mouffe (1992) actually writes that “radical democracy also means the radical impossibility of a fully realized democracy” (p. 14), but, as we have suggested above, her discussion of radical democracy can usefully be transcribed into a discussion of the notion and nature of community.

16 As Debbie Rodan (2004) writes, “agreement between cultures is more likely to be reached through negotiation and compromise than through a process of rational argumentation” (p. 67).

17 Interestingly, we could argue that our distinction between protectivist and humanitarian discourses represents a distinction that Mouffe draws between the differing traditions of democracy and liberalism. Proponents of a protectivist discourse would be firm adherents to democratic principles, while letter writers who claim, just as passionately, the need to see refugees as ‘people like us’ and who promote humanitarian practices are clearly drawing on the principles of liberalism. For Mouffe’s discussion of this distinction, see *The democratic paradox* (2000).