European and American Intellectuals at War

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It is impossible to understand the war waged by the USA against Iraq outside the larger framework of the neo-conservative project that was formulated and came to prominence with Ronald Reagan’s electoral victory in 1980. The men around George Bush Junior who today organise the implementation of this project have been working on it for more than 20 years. Most of them were already active in the Reagan administration, some like Donald Rumsfeld, were employed in the Ford administration even before 1976. This project—which is authoritarian in essence—involves a double strategy: to impose conservative values on American society through military mobilization, and to entrench American supremacy abroad through the use of unmasked and unbridled force. The fact that the arms industry profits hugely from neo-conservative policies should not hide the more important fact that they are driven by deep ideological convictions. Those beliefs are a mix of ultra-nationalism, extreme social conservatism, fascination for violence, religious fundamentalism and an absolute faith in the virtues of deregulated capitalism. In this ideological construct, war represents far more than just a strategic instrument. It is a model of ethics, an economic strategy, a religious calling; an aesthetic value. War is the metaphysical foundation of the neoconservative project, whose particular colours taint all aspects of their rhetoric and practice.

The end of the Cold War should have been considered a resounding victory by the neo-conservatives. In fact, it was a huge challenge, since it made military programmes redundant and called for a new, multilateral and possibly non-antagonistic definition of world relations. Against the threat of a post-Straussian, post-Schmittian state of world-affairs, neo-conservative circles have propagated the credo according to which “the Cold War was not won.” The USSR collapsed under its own weight, but the historical mission of America remains: to effectively impose democracy upon an otherwise resistant world. The neo-conservative answer to the challenge of the new world situation has been double. It is this answer that is shaping the world today: first new threats, new mortal enemies were invented—the basis of the concept of ‘rogue States’. Abruptly, in
1991, US diplomacy reversed its long policy of support in favour of Saddam Hussein and launched the first Gulf War. More importantly, the disappearance of the Soviet threat meant that the United States was by now the single superpower. The doctrine of empire was then reawakened. It is a very simple doctrine: it states that America should do everything necessary to remain the sole world power. To quote from the Project for a New American Century: “to maintain US preeminence, precluding the rise of a great rival power, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests.” This doctrine makes necessary what seems logically impossible to justify, namely investment, at an even more frantic pace, in military spending, at a time when the US spends as much as all of the nations of the world taken together.

Here is a description of the strategic programme of the New Right by one of the most expert observers of the American situation, Michael Klare in The Nation: In the concept of ‘transformation’ developed “by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his associates (…), … it is possible to detect a fundamental shift in strategic thinking—a shift with far-reaching implications for the United States and the world. The Defense Department will no longer organize its forces to counter specific military threats posed by clearly identifiable enemies, but instead will acquire a capacity to defeat any conceivable type of attack mounted by any imaginable adversary at any point in time—from now to the far-distant future. Put differently, this is a mandate for the pursuit of permanent military supremacy. The pursuit of permanent supremacy is not a new endeavor. Ever since the end of the cold war, policy-makers have sought to convert America’s sole-superpower status into an immutable fact of life. In the most explicit expression of this outlook, the Pentagon’s draft “Defense Planning Guidance” for fiscal years 1994-99, drawn up in February 1992, called for a concerted US effort to preserve its sole-superpower status into the foreseeable future. “Our first objective,” the highly classified document stated, “is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.”

This statement, attributed in part to Paul Wolfowitz, provoked a worldwide outcry when excerpts were published in the New York Times and the Washington Post. Although the idea of US military supremacy was too touchy to discuss publicly during the 1990s, the concept never fully disappeared. A number of prominent pundits and strategists continued to circulate the ideas contained in the original draft of the 1992 guidance document. Then, during the 2000 presidential campaign, proponents of this approach were given a new chance to advance their views by George W. Bush. In his most important speech on military policy, given at the Citadel in September 1999, Bush reiterated many of the concepts first articulated in the 1992 document. Pointing to America’s huge advantage in military technology, he promised “to take advantage of a tremendous opportunity—given to few nations in history—to extend the current peace into the far realm of the future. A chance to
project America’s peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across the years.”

After the preamble of a war of retribution launched in Afghanistan the previous year, the Iraq war was the first episode in the new chapter in world history being written in Washington by the neo-conservatives. It is the first battle in the ‘total war’ programmed by the new imperial doctrine.

This revolutionary transformation of American foreign policy would be untenable without a strong ideological underpinning. The role played by intellectuals in providing the justification of the imperial project is thus crucial. There are different types of intellectuals whose job it is to justify and glorify the new American expansion. First, there are senior members of the current administration, who have been writing strategy documents for 20 years, as the quote by Michael Klare makes clear. These powerful men sit on the boards of multinationals, most notably in the arms industry, but also on the boards of those think-tanks which provide the material and the veneer of future public policies. But there is also the large army of academics, publicists and journalists who, for ideological reasons, or because it simply pays to be on the powerful side, ensure the moral and political buttressing of right-wing policies. Robert Kagan’s famous concept of “the benevolent hegemony” of the New Empire is typical of these conceptual inventions that are supposed to win the support of the masses and provide moral guidance to the leaders. It is a concept that summarizes neatly in one formula the basis of the new project: our power is good, good for us and good for humanity, which is the same thing.

However, rather than focus only on this side of the American political spectrum, it is important to look also at the other side. It should be remembered that there was a strong movement against the war in the USA. Despite the strength of this opposition, however, a curious phenomenon took place. Some prominent left-wing intellectuals who opposed the war, spoke in extremely harsh terms towards the anti-war demonstrators and the “Old European” position. More problematically, they spoke in terms that seemed to indicate at least a partial convergence towards Republican policies. It is worthwhile focusing on this, because what is at stake in these debates is fundamental to understanding the current political situation. The core issue is the appraisal of American foreign policy in the 20th century, and more generally the question of the true nature of American democracy.

On that side of politics, the least ambiguous line is obviously the Chomsky-Pilger line. This line of critique sees in the conservative war agenda simply another outbreak of that chronic American “madness,” to use the words of English novelist John Le Carré, America’s violent will to power masked in moral self-righteousness and religious zeal, a madness that they have been denouncing for decades. Before the war started, they denounced the fabrications and the propaganda behind the case for war and were highly sceptical of the declarations of restraint on the part of the US army, and about the good intentions of the US government in the post-Saddam Iraq and in the Middle East in general. On these three fronts, they have been mostly vindicated by the facts. Other prominent intellectuals based in America who have opposed the war from this anti-imperialistic stance are the philosopher Judith Butler, Palestinian critic Edward Said, and Canadian journalist Naomi Klein. Less virulent against his own country in general, but no less
virulent against the government in place has been Richard Rorty. These intellectuals and the anti-war demonstrators have been attacked not only in the right-wing media, but also by prominent left-wing intellectuals, like Michael Kazin, Michael Walzer and Paul Berman, all members of the editorial board of the left-wing journal *Dissent*, Todd Gitlin, a famous leftwing sociologist, and English journalist Christopher Hitchens. The review *Dissent* has become the main vehicle of the moderate left’s incrimination of the radicals. Chomsky and the anti-war movement have been accused of failing to recognize the distinction between a liberal society like America and tyranny, of siding with the terrorists in their blind hatred of their own country. This rift in the American left is a reaction to the attacks of the 11th of September 2001. The unexpected brutality of these attacks provoked a patriotic reaction that made the moderate left totally impatient with any suggestion that America might have any responsibility in what had happened. Confronted with this horrendous event, the thinkers of the moderate left adopted three fundamental arguments, which taken to their logical consequences have brought them in the vicinity of neo-conservative arguments. This new conceptual construct provoked by the tragedy of the event can be traced most clearly in the five points of the paper that Michael Walzer delivered before the editorial board of *Dissent* in November 2001:

1. Only the “culture of excuse and apology” of “fallacious postmodernists” can really believe that terrorism is just a way for the powerful to describe the resistance of the less powerful. In point of fact, nothing can justify terrorism. Terrorism is absolute evil. The first consequence of this absolute moral principle is that it is immoral to link terrorist actions to a consideration of the effects of American policies overseas. The second consequence is that everything ought to be done to destroy terrorism. The war on terror is a moral duty. Third consequence: the war on terror must stop at nothing, whether in granting the police special powers inside, or in pursuing terrorist countries outside, until all terrorism has been eradicated.

2. Islamic fundamentalism signals the radical failure of the Islamic world to modernize itself. Islam is simply a “pre-modern culture.”

Much of the arguments developed in this early paper form the essence of the letter that was published in February 2002 entitled “What we’re fighting for.” The academic world was astounded to discover Michael Walzer’s signature next to those of Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington and other right-wing intellectuals. An implicit thought present in Michael Walzer’s draft paper was made explicit in the letter. This thought constitutes the third key idea that underlies the discourse of the moderate left.

3. The target of fundamentalists is America because America embodies modern civilisation and all that is good about it. What the terrorists want to destroy are American values, the pinnacle of modern civilisation, materialised in the American way of life. The converse
consequence of this idea is that it is immoral to raise the prospect that America might not live by its own standards, both within and without.

This philosophical position that defines the terms in which a just war against terrorism can and indeed must be fought provides the framework in which the current war is conceptualized by the moderate left. Their members reject the war, and highlight some of the dangerous features of the neo-conservative push towards Empire. But they offer such intricate reasoning to justify the morality of the opposition to war, they show so much disdain for the reasons used by the mass of the anti-war movement, that one cannot but have the feeling that their initial declarations of opposition to war are in fact contradicted by the case they actually make through their substantive arguments. A good example is an article entitled “No Strikes. Inspectors Yes, War No” by Michael Walzer, that appeared in September of 2002 in *The New Republic* (a journal that defended the invasion of Iraq). In the first half of the article Walzer showed why, at the end of the first gulf war, the system of weapons inspection was necessary but had to fail because of the unwillingness of the Europeans (France and Russia in particular), to seriously implement it. He then opposed the war on the ground that a system of inspection is morally superior. But the first half of the article had shown precisely why this could in fact never have been effectively implemented. The readers were left with this sorry conclusion: “what ought to be done when what ought to be done is not going to be done? If the dithering and delay go on and on—if the inspectors don’t return or if they return but can’t work effectively; if the threat of enforcement is not made credible; and if our allies are unwilling to act—then many of us will probably end up, very reluctantly, supporting the war the Bush administration seems so eager to fight.”

But some other issues, it would seem perfectly obvious to consider at this stage, find no place here. Questions like: Why Iraq, why now? Such facts as the American policy of constant disruption of the inspectors work from the mid-90s until the last day before the invasion started, the spying activities of inspectors, the real reasons behind the American and British enforcement of a no-flight zone over Northern Iraq, the history of Saddam’s rise to power, of US support for the use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ during the war with Iran, none of this finds a place in an article where Walzer is keen to teach us “the only correct way to oppose the war.” The facts about European meekness and lack of principle, on the other hand, are propounded at length.

The embrace by the moderate left of the new imperial doctrine is quite worrying. It provides important ethical credence to neo-conservative policies. Most notably it makes palatable again a notion that many thought had been disqualified for good in the horrors of the 20th century, the notion of the moral superiority of the West and its civilized mission, the old colonialist mantra of ‘the white man’s burden’. Respected thinkers in America and England have explicitly embraced the imperial project and given it a progressive tinge. Michael Ignatieff, a famous philosopher specialising in human rights, argued in favour of the ‘soft imperialism’ of American dominance, an ‘Empire lite’ as the least damaging option for the world. Where the moralism of the moderate Left can
lead in its angstful reliance on the strong men of the New Right became painfully clear in England last year, when Richard Cooper, a personal advisor to Tony Blair, published an essay in *The Observer*, endorsing the idea of a “liberal neo-colonialism.” In it, one can read the following: “The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era—force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves we keep the law, but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.” And further on: “What is needed is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.” The alliance between the English Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair and some of the highly conservative Prime ministers of the developed world reflects at the political level the temptation of moderate leftists to embrace Empire in the name of civilisation.

This kind of liberal justification for neo-imperialistic politics, however, is not representative of the stance taken by most European intellectuals towards the invasion of Iraq. Most of them opposed it. Only a few supported it on the ground that the atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime justified any intervention to stop them.

In the months preceding the war, the rift between the American and ‘Old European’ governments was mirrored in the rift splitting Western Academia. Only a few voices in America did not pour scorn over Europeans and European policies. The following words by Mark Lilla, Professor at the Committee on Social Thought at Chicago University, captured the general mood towards Europe before the war started: “What do the Europeans believe in?… They believe in a European Union with strong economy and small defence spending, so that their pensions can remain nice and thick. They believe in aid to development, the work of NGOs, the International Court of Justice, and all these are admirable things. Such politics can alleviate the suffering of people, but it can do nothing to prevent the suffering; it can certainly not defy tyranny or provide support to the hope that peoples might decide their own destiny. Western Europeans today hide behind their history.” The progressive thinker who claims to be opposed to the war and has only contempt for the spoilt Europeans, “has sympathy” for the naïve “democratic foolishness” of the Bush administration, that candidly believes that democracy is possible for the “half-modern cultures” of the Arab countries. Since the war has ended, the massacres of civilians, the utmost brutality with which the war has been conducted, the evidence of massive deception of public opinion, of conflicts of interest and hidden agendas, have led quite a few American journalists and academics to weaken their anti-European jibes and question the “democratic foolishness” of the “Hawks.”

Intellectuals are not immune to the debilitating effects of injured patriotism. However simplistic, this explanation cannot be rejected, to account for the—at times vitriolic—accusations exchanged between American and European intellectuals in the name of their homelands. More specifically, as Žižek has argued with some force, it would be worse
than naïve to assume that the reactions of the French and German governments were dictated solely by idealistic, lofty ideals. In their stubborn opposition to the American push to war, one important consideration was without doubt the attempt to reassert or at least retain their own hegemony over Europe. The nostalgia for grander (imperial) pasts and the resentment towards new real powers play a major part also in intellectual constructions. However, it is interesting to note that, immediately following his usual charge against Western leftists, Zizek cites what, according to him, is truly at stake, and also truly at risk, in the neo-conservative policies: “the most elementary international logic,” the international institutions to prosecute violations of human rights, the democratic principle, the “emancipatory excesses” of American society itself. What if, he asks, “the true target of the war on terror is the American society itself, i.e., the disciplining of its emancipatory excesses?”

What if, however, the best of the European response to the American invasion was precisely in the defence of just those institutions and ideals that Zizek himself listed? If that were the case, then the war against Iraq would have produced the unexpected rapprochement of the Slovenian philosopher with such unlikely comrades as Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas. In his *Letter to America*, H Habermas had already described the ideological battle between ‘Old Europe’ and leading Anglo-Saxon nations as a philosophical debate over the interpretation of ethical universalism, a choice between a “fully implemented human rights regime,” geared towards the ideal of a “future cosmopolitan order,” versus the “US and British tradition of liberal nationalism,” pushing towards an “international recognition of what they perceive to be the universalistic force of their own national values.” One year later, the post-structuralist community was shocked to see Jacques Derrida add his signature to a new text by Habermas in which Derrida states his agreement with Habermassian “premises and perspectives”: “the establishment of a new European political responsibility which goes beyond every form of eurocentrism, the appeal to a repeated confirmation and an effective transformation of international law and its praxis of the division of state powers.”

Europe represents a major challenge to the American drive towards Empire. The *Project for a New American Century* is explicit: “to maintain US preeminence, precluding the rise of a great rival power, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests.” With its large population, its high level of economic and political integration, its self-sufficiency, in the not too distant future even its energetic autonomy, Europe is one of the biggest obstacles to American hegemony. The agenda behind the invasion of Iraq was not just the control of oil, not just a crusade for Christ and Capital. It was also partly a way to gain the upper hand in the economic hegemony of a region traditionally controlled by Europe.

Finally, the struggle between America and Europe is not simply a classical power-struggle between imperial nations. It is equally a cultural and political différend. Chomsky pointed to the fact that social ideals, which continue to form an important part of the political language in Europe, even though they are also systematically undermined in everyday politics, are a threat to the neo-conservative agenda. When a progressive
writer like Mark Lilla speaks of the European concern for social equity in the terms that the quote above demonstrated, one can imagine what conservatives have to say about notions like universal health cover, public spending for reliable public services, higher taxes for the rich, or a 35-hour working week. These are all viruses, to use Chomsky’s metaphor, that must never reach the hard-working Americans.

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Notes

1. Donald Rumsfeld joined the Cabinet of President Nixon in 1969 (at the age of 37). In 1974 and 1975, he was Chief of Staff of the White House and a member of President Ford’s Cabinet.
2. As is well documented, the American war for freedom is closely linked with different kinds of Evangelical crusades. The democratic and the religious mottoes are the same: if you know you are in truth, it is a moral duty to impose it on others—by force if necessary.
4. To quote also from the opening message by Chairman William Kristol, on the Project’s website: “The Project for the New American Century is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle; and that too few political leaders today are making the case for global leadership’. <http://www.newamericancentury.org>.
7. In the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, Clausewitz’s analysis was reapplied by Adam Mersereau, a former Marine Corps officer. Here is an extract that has since been extensively quoted, and has often been attributed to Michael Ledeen: “By definition, limited war can achieve only limited results. If we are going to win a total victory in the war on terrorism while deterring other major wars around the globe, we will first have to rid ourselves of our aversion to total war. By “total” war, I mean the kind of warfare that not only destroys the enemy’s military forces, but also brings the enemy society to an extremely personal point of decision, so that they are willing to accept a reversal of the cultural trends that spawned the war in the first place. A total-war strategy does not have to include the intentional targeting of civilians, but the sparing of civilian lives cannot be its first priority. By contrast, “limited” war is the use of surgical military force to accomplish discreet foreign-policy goals without mobilizing the entire nation, and while minimizing casualties. The
purpose of “total” war is to permanently force your will onto another group, while the purpose of “limited” war is to temporarily deter or discourage an enemy, or to impede the policy of another country long enough to accomplish particular goals. Limited war pits combatants against combatants, while total war pits nation against nation, even culture against culture.” Adam G. Mersereau, “Why Is Our Military Not Being Rebuilt? The case for a total war” National Review Online, 24 May (2002).

8. Robert Kagan, “The benevolent empire,” Foreign Policy (Summer 1998). Here is a telling extract: “the truth about America's dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans—and far sooner.”


12. “America’s empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white man's burden. We are no longer in the era of the United Fruit Company, when American corporations needed the Marines to secure their investments overseas. The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known. It is the imperialism of a people who remember that their country secured its independence by revolt against an empire, and who like to think of themselves as the friend of freedom everywhere. It is an empire without consciousness of itself as such, constantly shocked that its good intentions arouse resentment abroad. But that does not make it any less of an empire, with a conviction that it alone, in Herman Melville's words, bears 'the ark of the liberties of the world, America’s Empire is an Empire lite’,” New York Times Magazine, January 10 (2003). In his latest publication, Michael Walzer embraces the notion of “virtual Empire” put forward by Martin Walker, “Is there an American Empire?,“Dissent, Fall (2003).


14. The French ‘nouveaux philosophes’ (Pascal Bruckner, Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard Henri-Lévy), and a few other literary figures (Romain Goupil, Maurice Le Dantec) were probably the most visible defenders of the idea of a war against Saddam Hussein.

15. William Pfaff of the International Herald Tribune was one such example. Judith Butler captured the mood of many in the anti-war movement when she claimed that the American left was to take its cue from the European left in the current situation.


17. Lt Col. Bryan McCoy, of the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, has been widely quoted in the international press for his candid description of the way the American army wages successful military campaigns: “We’re here until Saddam and his henchmen are dead’, he told me at one point during his march on Baghdad. ‘It’s over for us when the last guy who wants to fight for Saddam has flies crawling across his eyeballs. Then we go home. ‘It’s smashmouth tactics. Sherman said that war is cruelty. There’s no sense in trying to refine it. The crueler it is, the sooner it’s over’. When I suggested to Col. McCoy one morning that Iraqi civilians might not appreciate the manner in which his marines tended to say hello with the barrels of their guns raised, he did not make any excuses. ‘They don’t have to like us,’ he said. ‘Liking has nothing to do with it. You’ll never make them like you... All we can do is make them respect us and then make sure that they know we’re here on their behalf. Making them like us—Yanks always want to be liked, but it doesn’t always work out that way.” Peter Maass, “Heck of a day. Good kills Blood and grunts: To take Baghdad, marines of the Third Battalion fought the old-fashioned way, just as they’d been trained—by shooting as many of the enemy as they could. Not all their victims were soldiers,” New York Times Magazine, April 27 (2003).

18. In the article quoted above, Michael Walzer demonstrates far less understanding of the American government and far less hostility towards Europe. This shift is symptomatic of the general shift in the American media.


21. The joint letter, entitled “What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Heart of Europe” appears in Constellations, 10, 3 (2003), together with Habermas’ other text on Iraq, “Interpreting the fall of a Monument.” But perhaps the rapprochement should not have surprised us so much. Already in 2001, when Derrida thanked his German counterparts for having granted him the prestigious Adorno Prize, he asked the rhetorical question about himself: “Are you not an heir of the Frankfurt School?” He went on to sketch an ideal research program in which the similarities of recent French and German philosophy would be studied. He concluded with those words: “if those misunderstandings (between French and German philosophy) do not quite dissolve into thin air, but in any case have lost their virulence in an atmosphere of friendly reconciliation, it is not just thanks to the work, the reading, the honesty, the friendship of such and such, more often than not, thanks to the younger philosophers from this country. One must also take into account the growing consciousness of a responsibility, which, in respect to the future, and not just the future of Europe, it is now important to share: in political discussions, conversations, decisions, but also in those conversations which concern the essence of the political, in which new strategies to be invented are discussed, in discussions about what it will be important to take part in together, and finally about the logic, or even the aporias of a sovereignty which can no longer be accredited nor simply discredited—regarding new forms of capitalism and the world-market, as much as regarding the new shape, indeed the new constitution of Europe, which, in faithful unfaithfulness, should be everything but what the different crises of the European spirit that were diagnosed in this century have known. But also something different from a super-state, merely an economic or military opponent of the USA or China.” Jacques Derrida, “Le Monde diplomatique,” January (2002) 24-27 (my translation).

22. This thesis is most substantially developed by Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire. The Breakdown of the American Order, trans. C. Jon Delogu (Coulumbia: Columbia UP, 2003). See also I. Wallerstein, The Eagle Has Crash Landed, Foreign Policy 60, July/August (2002).